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ARTICLE

THE CHALLENGE OF "DIFFERENTIATED
CITIZENSHIP":
CAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS PROTECT TRIBAL
RIGHTS?
Rebecca Tsosie*

One of the most vexing problems in contemporary states
with large Native populations is whether the continuing
inequities between Native and non-Native peoples are best
addressed through the standard framework of "Federal Indian
Law," in which the federal government mediates tribal-state
relations, or through newly articulated legal relationships
between states and tribes. On a daily basis, tribes and states
engage each other as separate and distinct governments.
Sometimes these relationships are antagonistic, as tribes and
*
Lincoln Professor of Native American Law and Ethics and Executive Director,
Indian Legal Program, Arizona State University. This essay was inspired by the
illuminating exchange among the distinguished panelists at the University of Montana,
Montana Law Review's Honorable James R. Browning Symposium on the 1972 Montana
Constitution: Thirty Years Later, Sept. 12-14, 2002. The panelists addressed the
purpose and impact of the provision in Article X of the Montana Constitution addressing
Indian education. I am deeply indebted to those panelists: Ms. Julie Cajune, Director of
Indian Education for Ronan School District, Mr. Jeffrey Weldon, Chief Legal Counsel,
Montana Office of Public Instruction, and Professor Raymond Cross, University of
Montana School of Law, for giving a context and perspective that situated my own
academic study within the larger state and regional issues relating to Indian education
and education in Montana. They are the true experts on this provision.
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states pursue their often mutually exclusive rights to water
resources, jurisdiction, and tax revenues. But what about the
access of tribal and state citizens to "public goods" such as
education and health care? Does the state have the duty to
provide these goods to Native citizens as well as non-Native
citizens? Is it exempted from this duty because Native citizens
enjoy a special trust relationship with the United States
government? What are the legal, moral and ethical dimensions
of these important questions?
This article does not attempt to provide a definitive answer
or framework to address these issues. However, I would like to
use a particular legal provision, Article X of the Montana
Constitution, which addresses rights to education and Native
cultural heritage, to begin a discussion about future directions to
address tribal-state conflicts and the rights of Native and nonNative citizens. Part I of this article will outline the nature of
tribal rights as group rights that have both cultural and political
dimensions and will discuss the challenge of differentiated
citizenship for Native people, who are simultaneously citizens of
their Native nations, the United States, and the state in which
they reside. Part II will discuss the role of state constitutions in
protecting Native cultural and political rights, focusing
specifically on Article X of the Montana Constitution. Part III of
this article will discuss the impact of federal policy concerning
Native education and cultural heritage in articulating related
rights under state law. Part IV concludes the discussion by
addressing the broader legal, moral and ethical aspects of
differentiated citizenship for Native people.
I.

THE POLITICAL AND CULTURAL STATUS OF NATIVE NATIONS
AND THEIR MEMBERS

Federal Indian law has shaped a unique relationship
between the Indian nations and the United States government.
For much of this nation's history, the state governments had
little to do with the direct implementation of federal Indian
policy, although they clearly helped shape that policy through
political pressure for tribal lands and resources.
In the
contemporary era, the federal government retains a strong
presence in articulating Indian policy. However, the dynamics
have changed to represent the active participation of tribal
governments in the exercise of their right to self-determination.
There is also an increased trend on the part of tribal
governments to have direct political dealings with state
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol64/iss1/8
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governments. This section will first summarize the historical
background and structure of federal Indian law and policy, and
then examine contemporary aspects of domestic federalism
concerning the state, federal and tribal governments.
A. The HistoricalFoundationsof Federal Indian Policy
Historically, American jurisprudence has treated the
political relationship between Native nations and the various
states of the Union as a feature of federal constitutional law.
The Commerce Clause speaks of the sole and exclusive right of
the United States Congress to regulate trade among the several
states, with foreign nations, and with Indian tribes.' The Indian
Commerce Clause is generally cited as the constitutional
authority for this exclusive federal-tribal relationship, although
other provisions, such as the Treaty Clause 2 and the Property
4
Clause, 3 also support this relationship.
Federal Indian law is founded upon the treaty-based notion
that Indian nations are separate political sovereigns with their
own territorial boundaries. The treaties initiated by Great
Britain and then by the United States recognized Indian nations
as separate governments with internal self-governing powers
and the right to declare war and peace with external sovereigns.
They also recognized that the Indian nations held property
rights which they could convey to the United States government.
Chief Justice John Marshall drew on the treaty relationship
when he structured domestic federal Indian law with his famous
trilogy of opinions. 5 These opinions established the character of

1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
3.
2. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.2.
3. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl.
2.
4. See Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973) (holding that Indianowned lands outside of reservations and not in U.S. trust status are taxable by state).
"The power of Congress granted by Art. I, s 8 '(t)o regulate Commerce ...with the
Indian Tribes' is an exceedingly broad one. In the liquor cases the Court held that it
reached acts even off Indian reservations in areas normally subject to the police power of
the States." Id. at 159 (citation omitted) (Douglas, J., concurring).
5. In the first case, Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823), Marshall held that
the European "discovery" of North America vested in the European sovereigns the
paramount title to the land. Id. at 603. The Indian nations retained a more limited
property interest, known as the "right of occupancy," which could be divested only by the
European sovereign through "purchase" or "conquest." Id. at 545, 574. The Doctrine of
Discovery was intended to protect the integrity of the "discovering" nation's land title
from competing claims by other European sovereigns. Id. at 568. However, it operated
to divest the Indian nations of their full rights as territorial sovereigns to exclude or
include other nations from their territory at will. Instead, they were locked into a
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Indian tribes as "domestic, dependent nations" holding rights of
occupancy in their traditional lands and territories, as well as
rights of self-government that were independent of state control.
Under Chief Justice Marshall's jurisprudence, Indian nations
were not incorporated into the federal Union. They were preConstitutional
governments who
maintained
sovereign
authority within their territorial boundaries. The states were
precluded from applying their laws within Indian Country, or,
indeed, from having any relationship with the tribes at all,
except with the consent of the tribes or the federal government.
As Chief Justice Marshall stated in Worcester v. Georgia: "[tihe
whole intercourse between the United States and this nation, is,
by our constitution and laws, vested in the government of the
United States."6 According to Chief Justice Marshall, the
federal government's authority over Indian affairs, rooted in the
federal Constitution, laws and treaties, was directed toward
implementing its duty to protect Indian nations.
The federal duty of protection has been regarded, rather
paternalistically, as creating a guardian-ward relationship,
whereby the federal government, as trustee, regulates Indian
affairs in order to protect the tribal beneficiaries. However, in
contemporary society, the guardian-ward relationship does not
always represent reality. Native people are still tribal citizens,
and Native nations still possess a trust relationship with the
United States. However, Native people are also now citizens of
the United States as well as citizens of the state in which they
reside.7 The political relationships between the states, tribes
and the federal government are being reconfigured to reflect this
differentiated citizenship, as well as to reflect the increasing

bilateral bargain with the discovering sovereign when alienating their land rights. In
that respect, the opinion had a devastating effect on the later construction of tribal
sovereignty.
In the Cherokee cases, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831), and Worcester v.
Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832), which followed Johnson v. McIntosh, Chief Justice Marshall
considered whether the state of Georgia could exercise jurisdiction over land within its
boundaries that was held by the Cherokee Nation. In a phrase that has endured within
Federal Indian law, Marshall referred to the tribes as "domestic, dependent nations."
Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 18. The Cherokee Nation was, he said, a "distinct political
society, separated from others, capable of managing its own affairs and governing itself."
Id. at 16. Although Indian tribes had the political status of "nations," they were not
"foreign nations" because they were within the territorial boundaries of the United
States and because, through the treaties, they had placed themselves under the sole
protection of the United States. Id. at 18.
6.
Worcester, 31 U.S. at 561.
7. Citizenship Act of 1924, 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (2002).
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autonomy of tribal governments.
Notably, however, these emerging political relationships
rest upon a historical legacy of federal Indian policy that often
sacrificed tribal rights for the interests of the developing states
and their citizenry. Thus, it is important to understand how
Congressional policy toward Indian nations has vacillated over
the years in response to the needs and interests of the
encompassing society of the United States and its citizens.
B. The Impact of Changing CongressionalPolicies
The policies of the United States and Great Britain toward
Indian nations span a continuum between those that recognize
the separate political autonomy of Indian nations and those that
seek to destroy, assimilate or incorporate the Indian nations.
During the colonial period, Great Britain used treaties to form
political alliances with Indian nations in order to secure land
rights and political allegiance, both of which were necessary for
colonization. After the Revolutionary War, the United States
struggled to establish its own political sovereignty and employed
the same policies to secure political alliances with powerful
Indian nations. However, after the War of 1812, the United
States assumed a more dominant position, and its policies with
Indian nations began to reflect a more aggressive stance.
Additionally, it became important for the federal
government to assert its supremacy over the state governments.
The Articles of Confederation had given states some measure of
authority to deal with Indian nations.8
The Constitution,
however, asserted the supremacy of the national government
over Indian policy, as did the Trade and Intercourse Acts which
precluded the states from engaging in transactions to gain
Indian land without the consent of the federal government. 9
The states, however, played a very important political role
in shaping federal Indian policy. On an ideological level this
was represented by the federal government's 19th century
manifest destiny policy. The development of the Western
territories coincided with the need of the eastern states to gain
the maximum amount of territory for non-Indian settlers. After
1812, the federal government began to encourage Indian tribes
to voluntarily remove westward, and such provisions were
inserted into several Indian treaties, including the 1817 Treaty
8.

ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX,

9.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.

§ 4.
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with the Cherokee Nation. However, many Indian nations
resisted this process, and toward the latter part of the 1820s, the
conflicts between the states and tribes escalated. Chief Justice
Marshall's opinions in the Cherokee cases emerged from the
conflict as the State of Georgia sought to extend its laws to the
Cherokee Nation's territory in order to annihilate the separate
political existence of the Cherokee people. In 1830, Congress
passed the Removal Act, authorizing the President of the United
States to exchange Indian lands for lands west of the
Jackson's
Andrew
President
During
Mississippi.
administration, the Removal Act was used to forcibly remove
many eastern and southeastern tribes to the western "Indian
territory." The Removal policy continued throughout the 19th
century and displaced Indian nations across the country from
their ancestral lands. Others, for example, the Mississippi
Choctaw, resisted and stayed on their lands, despite the
considerable hardships that this entailed.
Importantly, the earlier norms established by the treaty
policy, which perceived Indian nations as autonomous
governments, were reconceptualized to support the idea that
Indians were savages who could not coexist with civilization. 10
Georgia Governor George Gilmer, for example, characterized the
Indian treaties as "expedients by which ignorant, intractable,
and savage people were induced without bloodshed to yield up
what civilized people had a right to possess by virtue of that
command of the Creator delivered to man upon his formationbe fruitful, multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it.""
As "savages," the Indian nations could not claim the full political
between
agreements
treaty
in
recognized
autonomy
for the
the
basis
idea
became
This
governments.
international
United States Supreme Court's 1903 decision in Lone Wolf v.
Hitchcock that the United States could unilaterally abrogate
provisions of an Indian treaty and that this was a "political
2
question" that could not be litigated in the federal courts.'
During the latter part of the 19th Century, the federal
government increasingly restricted the reservation landbase of
the Indian nations and instituted rigorous assimilation policies.
10. See Robert A. Williams, Jr., Documents of Barbarism: The Contemporary
Legacy of European Racism and Colonialism in the Narrative Traditions of Federal
Indian Law, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 237 (1989).
11.

DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 97

(4th ed. 1998).
12. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
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The plenary power aspect of federal Indian law coincided with
the government's assimilation policies to justify the extreme
federal control over Indian people necessary to accomplish these
policies. These assimilation policies were designed to impair
and destroy the separate political, social, cultural, and economic
structures of Indian nations, and to inculcate the forced
13
dependency of Indian people.
The ultimate assimilation policy was represented by the
Dawes Allotment Act of 1887, which sought to break up the
collective landholdings of the Indian nations by granting
"allotments" of tribal lands in severalty to individual tribal
members and selling the surplus lands on the reservation to
non-Indian settlers. 14
The Allotment policy resulted in a
massive expropriation of tribal landholdings to non-Indians,
estimated at approximately 90 million acres. In addition, it
created an unwieldy pattern of checkerboard land ownership
that persists on many reservations. Today, non-Indians often
hold fee parcels of land within the reservation. Adjacent lands
may be held in fee by tribal members or their descendants, or
may be held as restricted "trust allotments" by tribal members.
Many tribes retained tribal trust lands on the reservation, as
well. This pattern of ownership caused a great deal of economic
inefficiency and also resulted in many serious jurisdictional
problems for Indian nations.
The New Deal reformers radically transformed federal
Indian law primarily through the Indian Reorganization Act of
1934 (IRA). 15 The IRA officially ended the practice of allotment
with respect to tribally owned lands and supported the growth
and development of tribal self-government under a Western
constitutional model. Indian nations were invited to adopt
centralized, constitutional governments composed of a tribal
13. For example, the federal government established Indian agents on the
reservations and developed a bureaucratic structure designed to enhance the authority
of these agents and their staff and to break down the traditional governments of the
Indian nations. The development of Indian police on reservations, for example, imposed
a Western structure of law and order designed to break down the traditional systems of
the Indian nations. The federal government also sought to assimilate Indian people by
stamping out Native languages and religions. This was accomplished, for example,
through government boarding school policies and Christianization programs, as well as
administrative regulations which criminalized many religious and social practices (e.g.,
traditional marriage practices which authorized more than one wife). See generally,
VINE DELORIA, GOD IS RED: A NATIVE VIEW OF RELIGION (2d ed. 1994); and VINE
DELORIA, JR. & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICAN JUSTICE (1983).

14.
15.

25 U.S.C. §§ 331-334 (2002).
25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (2002).
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council, whose members would be selected by a majority vote of
the tribe. The tribal council would be vested with the power to
make dispositions of land and to negotiate with the federal,
state and local governments on matters of political or economic
importance. The IRA also promoted economic development
efforts by tribally organized corporations.
While the IRA emphasized the separate political status of
Indian nations, federal policy shifted again toward assimilation
during the Termination Era, which lasted from 1940s to the
early 1960s. The ideology of Termination purported to be based
on equality of citizenship for Indian people and the need to free
the designated tribes from federal supervision and control. The
Termination policy was implemented through a series of
individual acts that applied to specific tribes, including the
Menominee, Klamath, Catawba and Ponca. Under the terms of
these acts, the tribe's trust relationship with the United States
The tribe's lands and resources were
government ended.
generally liquidated into a monetary payment, which could be
distributed to tribal members. Those members would then join
the workforce in urban areas and establish their households as
equal state citizens without the special rights, privileges and
immunities that would apply to members of federally recognized
tribes. The federal government's Relocation policy, designed to
mainstream reservation Indians by encouraging them to
voluntarily relocate to big urban cities like San Francisco and
Chicago in exchange for job training and housing assistance,
worked in tandem with Termination to achieve the same goals.
Another key piece of Termination Era legislation is Public
Law 280, which was enacted in 1953 in response to the demand
of several states to assert jurisdiction over Indian lands within
As originally enacted, Public Law 280
their boundaries.
extended state civil and criminal jurisdiction over reservation
Indians in several enumerated states, including Alaska,
California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon and Wisconsin, with
limited exceptions. Other states were authorized to assume
jurisdiction over Indian reservations at their discretion.
Congress subsequently enacted a provision in the Civil Rights
Act of 1968 that no state could acquire Public Law 280
jurisdiction over the objections of the Indians who would be
affected by the state's assumption of such jurisdiction. Public
Law 280 had negative consequences for both the Indian nations
and the states. The impacts upon tribal self-governance and law
enforcement problems are legendary. However, Congress was
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol64/iss1/8
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only persuaded to implement a "retrocession" option when the
states demonstrated the tremendous financial impact of this
jurisdiction. Public Law 280 is still in force in many states,
including California, and has in many cases discouraged the
development of tribal justice systems by tribes in those states. 16
The practice of Termination effectively ended in the early
1960s under the Kennedy administration. In 1970, President
Nixon formally repudiated the policy and called for an end to
Termination and a commitment to "Self-Determination" for
Indian nations. Some of the terminated tribes were eventually
reinstated to trust status.
The Self-Determination policy
reflects a commitment to tribal autonomy rather than the
paternalistic federal control of past Indian policy yet continues
the commitment to provide federal assistance to Indian
nations. 17 Thus, the Self-Determination policy endorses tribal
control over federal programs. The federal government's SelfDetermination policy is still in effect, although the Supreme
Court continues to struggle in reconciling notions of tribal
sovereignty with Congress' commitment to self-determination. 8
As this survey of American policy demonstrates, the federal
government has brokered the conflicts between states and tribes
since the early days of this country's history. In many cases,
tribal interests were sacrificed for the good of the American
citizenry. However, in the contemporary era, the policy of selfdetermination suggests an increasing role for tribal autonomy,
particularly over matters of local governance. In that sense, it is
important for Indian nations to engage in reciprocal, political
relationships with state and local governments. This article will
now turn to examine the contemporary contours of domestic
federalism, against the historic backdrop of federal Indian law
and policy.

16. CAROLE GOLDBERG-AMBROSE & TIMoTHY CARR SEWARD,
FEATHERS: TRIBAL SURVIVAL AND PUBLIC LAW 280 (1997).

PLANTING TAIL

17. In addition to the famous 1988 Indian Self-Determination and Education
Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. § 450b (2002), Congress has also passed a number of other
statutes which reflect this commitment, including the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978,
25 U.S.C. § 1903 (2002), the American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. §
1996 (2002), the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 25 U.S.C. §
3001 (2002), the Self-Governance Act, 25 U.S.C. § 458aa (2002), the Indian Land
Consolidation Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2201 (2002), and the Tribally-Controlled School Grants
Act of 1988, 25 U.S.C. § 2501 (2002).
18. See, e.g., Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978); Montana v.
United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
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C. The Contemporary Contours of Domestic Federalism
In the contemporary era, Indian nations are actively
involved in self-governance on every level, including economic
development, educational administration, and institutional
development of their judicial systems and administrative
agencies. Through these structures, tribal governments interact
with state and local governments on a variety of issues,
including law enforcement, environmental regulation, and the
administration of health and education resources. The legal
framework for adjudicating these governmental interactions is
still in the developing stage and has aspects that resemble the
structures used to adjudicate interstate issues (e.g., tribal-state
compacts) as well as the structures used to adjudicate issues
involving international sovereigns (e.g., principles of comity).
The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. §§
2701-2721, exemplifies the trend in federal legislation to
promote effective state-tribal cooperation. The IGRA authorizes
Indian nations to engage in gaming on the reservation so long as
state law does not prohibit this, and so long as the state and the
tribe have reached agreement on the nature and scope of the
activities through a compact. Although the IGRA compacting
provision has engendered a great deal of litigation between
states and tribes, the provision is notable because it attempts to
bridge the historical division between states and tribes through
the use of alternative dispute resolution.
The compacting
procedure is similar to interstate compacts which are used to
resolve interjurisdictional issues between sister states and
reflects a baseline notion of bilateral cooperation between
autonomous sovereigns.
The changing contours of domestic federalism are
particularly apparent from IGRA and the development of statetribal judicial relations that focus upon mutual recognition of
orders and judgments and cooperative interjurisdictional
enforcement.
Although the IGRA attempts to create a
consensual model for political interaction, the litigation over
state-tribal IGRA compacts raises a serious issue: Can parties
who have had a historically antagonistic relationship be
expected to negotiate in good faith, particularly in cases where
the state does not perceive Indian gaming to be beneficial to its
own interests? 19 The likelihood that the parties will reach
19. See Rebecca Tsosie, Negotiating Economic Survival: The Consent Principleand
Tribal-StateCompacts Under the Indian Gaming RegulatoryAct, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 25, 72
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agreement may depend upon a number of factors, including the
parties' perception of the agreement as mutually beneficial, and
whether the agreement is perceived to be voluntary or coerced.
Tribal-state relations are colored by the bitter history of
land appropriation and the on-going set of jurisdictional
tensions between tribal and state governments. In the last few
decades, for example, states have litigated over tribal cigarette
sales, tribal regulation of non-Indian owned fee land on the
reservation, tribal taxation, and a number of other claims
designed to impair tribal sovereignty and expand the scope of
state power. This litigation, combined with a long-standing
history of racial animosity between Indians and non-Indians in
the rural counties abutting the reservations, often causes the
tribes to expect the worst in state relationships.
The interactions between state and tribal court systems also
illustrate these problems. For example, to what extent should a
state court give full effect to a tribal court judgment?
Conversely, to what extent should a tribal court give full effect
to a state court judgment? These issues are alternatively
considered under a comity analysis or a full faith and credit
analysis. New Mexico is among the states that treat tribal court
judgments as entitled to full effect under the full faith and credit
clause. 20 Many states, including Montana, will extend comity,
but not full faith and credit to tribal court judgments. 2 1 Under
Montana statutes and case law, the state court can decline to
enforce such a judgment for "want of jurisdiction, want of notice
22
to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact."
Indian law scholar Frank Pommersheim discusses
contemporary tribal-state tensions in his book, Braid of
Feathers.23 He notes that in South Dakota, as in many states,
"tribal-state relations are often caught in a history of actions
that are perceived (rightly or wrongly) by many tribes as having

(1997).
20. In Jim v. CIT FinancialServices Corporation,the New Mexico Supreme Court
"held that the laws of the Navajo Tribe of Indians are entitled by Federal Law, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738, to full faith and credit in the courts of New Mexico because the Navajo Nation is
a 'territory" within the meaning of that statute." 87 N.M. 362, 363, 533 P.2d 751, 752
(1975).
21. See Margery H. Brown & Brenda C. Desmond, Montana Tribal Courts:
Influencing the Development of Contemporary Indian Law, 52 MONT. L. REV. 211, 253
(1991); Wippert v. Blackfeet Tribe, 201 Mont. 299, 654 P.2d 512 (1982).
22. Wippert, 201 Mont. at 305, 654 P.2d at 515.
23.
FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS: AMERICAN INDIAN LAW AND
CONTEMPORARY TRIBAL LIFE (1997).
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as their main objective the undermining of the tribe's very
existence." 24 In short, he cautions, "the playing field has never
been level." Professor Pommersheim suggests that this "unfair
slope could be corrected if certain principles could be embedded
in a set of negotiated sovereignty accords." 25 He suggests that in
order to improve relations, states must demonstrate "publicly
and in writing that they recognize tribal sovereignty-that is,
the right of tribal governments to exist, to endure, and to
flourish."26
Such a set of accords might then "establish
innovative new political and diplomatic protocols" that would
enhance tribal-state relations. 27 For example, the Centennial
Accord between the State of Washington and the sovereign
tribes of that region provides that:
[Elach party to this Accord respects the sovereignty of the other.
The respective sovereignty of the state and each federally
recognized tribe provide paramount authority for that party to
exist and to govern. The parties share in their relationship
particular respect for the values and cultures represented by tribal
governments. Further, the parties share a desire for a complete
accord between the State of Washington and federally recognized
tribes in Washington respecting a full government to government
relationship and will work with all state and tribal governments to
28
achieve such an Accord.

The approach suggested by Professor Pommersheim speaks
to an emerging norm of mutuality, reciprocity, and respect
between sovereign governments that share much of the same
region. The state constitution, however, is the instrument that
spells out many of the state's fundamental values and norms.
What effect, then, do state constitutional provisions have on
Native peoples' rights? This article will next engage the role of
state constitutions in adjudicating the rights, duties and
responsibilities that inhere in the notion of a differentiated
citizenship for Native peoples.

II. THE ROLE OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN PROTECTING NATIVE
RIGHTS
State constitutions can protect Native rights by protecting
the political and cultural rights of Native nations or by
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 153.
Id.
Id. at 154.

Id.
FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS: AMERICAN INDIAN LAW AND

CONTEMPORARY TRIBAL LIFE 154 (1997).
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protecting the rights of Native people as state citizens or as
members of distinctive cultural groups. The rights of Indian
nations and their members are heavily influenced by both
federal and tribal law, which means that state constitutional
protections are to some extent limited or framed by exterior
legal systems. The Montana Constitution is set up to govern the
interaction of the state and its citizens, many of whom are
Native American. Toward this end, the Montana Constitution
has general protections that are judicially extended to Native
citizens and non-Native citizens, as well as provisions that
29
relate specifically to Native American people.
A.

State ConstitutionalProvisions that Secure General Rights

The Washington Centennial Accord speaks to the political
relationship between sovereigns: Indian nations and states.
Indeed, the oldest state constitutional provisions concerning
Indian tribes are founded upon that distinction. Most state
constitutions contain the general disclaimer of state jurisdiction
over Indian lands that was a condition of being admitted to
statehood.3 0 In some cases, courts have used such provisions to
justify legislation that protects tribal rights on a distinctive
basis. For example, in Livingston v. Ewing, the United States
District Court for the District of New Mexico used the state
disclaimer statute to justify special protection for Indian artists
and craftsmen, citing the special relationship that exists
31
between the state and the tribal governments.
Most states, however, have not interpreted these general
disclaimer provisions as supporting recognition of "special
rights" for Native people, raising the question of whether Native
interests can be protected under the "neutral" provisions of state

29. It should be noted that the Montana Constitution specifically protects the
reserved water rights of Indian nations in pending water adjudication actions. In
Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes v. Clinch, 1999 MT 342, 297 Mont. 448, 992
P.2d 244, the Montana Supreme Court held that issuing water permits for the use of
water that may belong to a tribe violates Article 9, Section 3, Paragraph 1 of the
Montana Constitution if issued prior to the quantification of the Indian tribes' pervasive
reserved right. Clinch, 1999 MT at 27, 297 Mont. at 27, 992 P.2d at 27.
30. See, e.g., MONT. CONST. art. I, § 1 (providing that the agreement and
declaration that all lands owned or held by any Indian or Indian tribes shall remain
under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the United States and
shall remain in full force and effect until revoked by the consent of the United States and
the people of Montana).
31. 455 F. Supp. 825, 830 (D. N.M. 1978), affd, 601 F.2d 1110 (10th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 870 (1979).
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constitutions. How do general constitutional guarantees-for
example, of equal protection and due process-protect the rights
of Native people as both state and tribal citizens? The Montana
Supreme Court has been persistent in its efforts to use these
provisions to address the reservation-based claims of its Indian
citizens. 32 According to Professors Brown and Desmond, the
movement of the Montana Supreme Court to authorize state
jurisdiction over reservation-based disputes stemmed in part
from tribal constitutional and statutory provisions that
disclaimed tribal jurisdiction over certain classes of cases. In
cases where there was arguably no tribal remedy, the state
courts reasoned that they should assume jurisdiction. 33 Not
surprisingly, this focus can come into conflict with principles of
tribal sovereignty and federal preemption. 34 Given the special
relationship that exists between the Indian nations and the
federal government, state constitutional protections must be
reconciled with federal and tribal law.
This attempt to reconcile competing interests is
demonstrated in several equal protection cases. In Lambert v.
Ryozik, for example, a tribal member raised an equal protection
challenge and the Supreme Court of Montana affirmed the right
of Indian plaintiffs to bring claims against non-Indians in state
court. 35 The Montana Supreme Court based its decision on the
premise that failure to recognize the basic right of Indian
litigants to bring this claim would deprive them of equal
protection under Article II, Section 4 of the Montana
Constitution, and also deprive them of the right to sue for such
actions that is guaranteed to Montana citizens under Article II,
Section 16 of the Montana Constitution.
Notably, this argument cannot succeed in a context where
the legal proceeding involves only tribal members, given the
competing interests of the tribe as sovereign. In Fisher v.
District Court, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the
Northern Cheyenne Tribal Court had exclusive jurisdiction over
an adoption proceeding in which all parties were members of the
36
Tribe and residents of the Northern Cheyenne Reservation.

32. See Brown & Desmond, supra note 21, at 264.
33. See id. at 270.
34. See id. at 268-286 (discussing Montana cases eliciting the conflict between
tribal sovereignty and federal preemption).
35. 268 Mont. 219, 886 P.2d 378 (1994).
36. 424 U.S. 382 (1976).
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The Court used the Williams infringement test 37 and held that
state jurisdiction would interfere with the powers of selfgovernment conferred upon the Northern Cheyenne Tribe and
exercised through the tribal court.
The Court found no
impermissible racial discrimination in the denial of access to the
state courts to the Indian plaintiffs. The Court stated that the
tribal court's exclusive jurisdiction stemmed not from the race of
the plaintiff, but from the quasi-sovereign status of the Northern
Cheyenne Tribe under federal law.
The Fishercase involved a domestic relations case where all
parties were tribal members living on the reservation. Where
the tribal members reside off the reservation, the jurisdictional
issues become a bit more ambiguous. The area of domestic
relations has traditionally fallen solely within state police
powers.
However, the Federal Indian Child Welfare Act
(ICWA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963, limits state jurisdiction over
Indian children who are members of federally recognized tribes,
or are eligible for membership in such tribes. The ICWA is
intended to ensure the continuity of tribal existence and tribal
cultural integrity by protecting Native families. The ICWA
provides that in any adoptive placement of an Indian child, the
following preferences shall be recognized: (1) a member of the
child's extended family; (2) other members of the child's tribe; or
(3) other Indian families.
Similar criteria are used in the
placement of foster children.
Tribal courts have exclusive
jurisdiction over Indian children domiciled on the reservation,
and a strong presumption exists in favor of tribal court
jurisdiction over Indian children domiciled off the reservation.
Some state courts have attempted to assert their regulatory
power over Indian children domiciled off the reservation on the
basis of a judicially crafted doctrine-the "existing Indian family
exception"-that provides for state, rather than tribal,
jurisdiction where the child's family does not have significant
ties to their tribal community. The state courts generally reason
that the child will be deprived of important constitutional rights
if ICWA is applied in such cases. For example, in In re Bridget
R., the California Court of Appeals held that the ICWA poses
due process, equal protection and 10th amendment problems to
the extent that it is applied to persons who have given up their
social and cultural status as "tribal" Indians. 38

37.
38.

358 U.S. 217 (1959).
49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
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Notably, the Montana Supreme Court has rejected the
"existing Indian family exception." 39 In In re Adoption of Riffle,
the Montana Supreme Court applied the Montana Constitution
and cited the purpose of the ICWA is to "protect the best
interests of Indian children by retaining their connection to their
tribes" and gave preference to the child's maternal uncle. 40 In re
M.E.M. involved a dependency and neglect action concerning a
child and mother who were both members of the Standing Rock
Sioux Tribe. 41 The mother appealed from a judgment of the
state district court which terminated her parental rights. The
court determined that it was the constitutional duty of Montana
to preserve the unique cultural heritage and integrity of the
American Indians. This right is derived from Article X, Section
1(2) of the Montana Constitution. The Montana Supreme Court
reversed the judgment terminating parental rights and
remanded the case for a hearing de novo on the jurisdictional
issues regarding the potential transfer of the case to tribal court
under ICWA. The dissenting judge would have gone one step
further and reversed with instructions to the district court to
transfer the proceedings without delay to the Standing Rock
Tribal Court.
It is notable that the Montana courts in these cases looked
to the special protections for Native cultural heritage embodied
in Article X of the Montana Constitution to construe the rights
of Native litigants. Although many states have statutes that
address the unique rights or status of Native peoples-for
example, those dealing with language rights, repatriation rights,
or the rights of Native artists-only two state constitutions
appear to contain provisions specifically addressing the unique
culture and status of Native peoples: Montana and Hawaii.
Both the Montana and Hawaii constitutional provisions on
protection of Native culture are the result of contemporary
constitutional conventions that sought to address the unique
status of Native peoples within the states' boundaries. In the
next section of the article, I will focus on the Montana
Constitution, but provide a brief note, for comparative purposes,
on the Hawaii Constitution.

39.
40.
41.

In re Adoption of Riffle, 277 Mont. 388, 922 P.2d 510 (1996).
277 Mont. at 393, 922 P.2d at 514.
195 Mont. 329, 635 P.2d 1313 (1981).
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B. ConstitutionalProtectionsfor Native CulturalHeritage and
Distinctive Status
Like many western states, Montana has a significant
American Indian population and contains a substantial
proportion of Indian land. There are seven Indian reservations
within the State of Montana that comprise the homeland of the
following Indian nations: the Confederated Salish & Kootenai
Tribe of the Flathead Reservation; the Crow Tribe; the Northern
Cheyenne Tribe; the Blackfeet Indian Nation; the ChippewaCree Tribes of the Rocky Boy's Reservation; and the Gros
Ventre, Sioux and Assiniboine Tribes of the Fort Belknap and
Fort Peck Reservations. 42
The delegates to the 1972
Constitutional Convention specifically addressed this rich
diversity of Native cultures in Article X of the Constitution,
which speaks to Native American culture and education within
its broader coverage of "educational goals and duties."
Article X, Section 1 of the Montana Constitution provides
that:
(1) It is the goal of the people to establish a system of
education which will develop the full educational potential of
each person. Equality of educational opportunity is guaranteed
to each person of the state.
(2) The state recognizes the distinct and unique cultural
heritage of the American Indians and is committed in its
educational goals to the preservation of their cultural integrity.
(3) The legislature shall provide a basic system of free
quality public elementary and secondary schools... [and] shall
fund and distribute in an equitable manner to the school
districts the state's share of the cost of the basic elementary and
secondary school system.
As Professor Raymond Cross points out, it is necessary to
read these three provisions together in construing the ultimate
meaning and impact of Article X, Section 1(2). 43 Article X is
directed toward securing "equality of educational opportunity,"
including equitable funding for all school districts, for every
student in the State-whether Indian or non-Indian. However,
42. Scott B. McElroy & Jeff J. Davis, Revisiting ColoradoRiver Water Conservation
District v. United States-There Must be a Better Way, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 597 (1995).
43. CD: Section No. 7 on Tribal-State Constitutional Relationships at the
Symposium on the 1972 Montana Constitution: Thirty Years Later, held by the Montana
Law Review (Sept. 12-14, 2002) (on file with University of Montana Law Library)
[hereinafter Symposium CD] (comments by panelist Professor Ray Cross).
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Article X, Section 1(2) appears to consider preservation of Native
cultural heritage as a key component of this process. Indeed,
Professors Elison and Snyder interpret this language to
acknowledge a heightened need to protect Native cultures
within Montana and to place this responsibility primarily within
the educational system. 44 They suggest that this responsibility
is necessary to remediate the "increasing sense of separation
between the Montana tribes and the rest of the state," which is
exacerbated by existing conflicts over gambling and water
45
rights.
The language in Article X, Section 1(2) was the result of two
issues that surfaced at the Constitutional Convention: "the need
to acknowledge American Indians in the state constitution in
some manner, and the need for knowledge and understanding
between the Indian and non-Indian segments of the population
of Montana." 46
The delegates to the 1971-72 Montana
Constitutional Convention expressed various motivations for
supporting the Indian education and culture provision, although
they uniformly agreed that the provision could be used to protect
"a wide range of Indian cultural and educational endeavors." 47
Delegate Dorothy Eck introduced this provision to provide
Indian students with a constitutional entitlement to state
sponsored educational and cultural programs that would
develop their self-esteem and personal identity through "the
study of their Native culture and language." 48 Other delegates
characterized the provision as a means to remedy past
discrimination against American Indians and to foster "social
and economic competition for them in Montana." 49 Delegate
James Champoux "testified that this constitutional provision
was the appropriate way to protect the unique manner in which
Indian people educated their children within their culture and

44.

LARRY M. ELISON & FRITZ SNYDER, THE MONTANA STATE CONSTITUTION: A

REFERENCE GUIDE 177 (G. Tarr ed., Reference Guides to the State Constitutions of the
U.S., No. 31, 2001).
45. Id. at 178.
46. Cynthia Ford, Integrating Indian Law into a Traditional Civil Procedure
Course, 46 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1243, 1256 n.52 (1996) (citing the Montana Legislative
Council, The Montana Constitution and American Indians (1995)).
47. Raymond Cross, American Indian Education: The Terror of History and the
Nation's Debt to the Indian Peoples, 21 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 941, 966 n.113
(1999).
48. Id. (citing the 1971-72 Montana Constitution and Convention at 1950 (March
10, 1972)) (on file at the University of Montana Law School Library).
49. Id.
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societies. '50 The measure passed by a vote of 83-1, with the lone
dissenter voicing an objection that Indian peoples should not be
51
identified in the constitution as a "special group."
The delegates' comments illustrate at least three different
responses to state-tribal constitutional relations. The comments
by Ms. Eck and Mr. Champoux illustrate a belief that Native
American cultural integrity is a value that merits protection
under state constitutional law. This approach, which supports a
rich notion of cultural pluralism, centers upon the unique value
of Native cultures and societies within Montana. The delegates
who analogized the provision to antidiscrimination legislation
illustrate the belief that social equality in contemporary society
depends upon remedial legislation for past harms.
This
approach is consistent with other efforts to remedy past
discrimination by introducing special provisions for the benefit
of disadvantaged groups, such as affirmative action programs.
The dissenter's comments illustrate the view that the rights of
all citizens can be protected under "neutral" provisions that are
applicable to everyone, such as "equal protection" guarantees.
Under this view, "special rights" are necessarily suspect because
they draw distinctions between citizens, and thus are
destructive of a unitary civil society.
This constitutional provision is quite unique and does not
have a counterpart in any other state constitution. However, for
thirty years the provision has merely served as a hortatory
statement on the ideals to be achieved by state law. It has
guided state courts in interpreting other issues-e.g.,
termination of parental rights to an Indian child-that relate to
cultural heritage. 52
And dicta from one opinion ties the
provision to the issue of educational equity, finding that the
"provision establishes a special burden in Montana for the
education of American Indian children which must be addressed
as a part of the school funding issues."5 3 However, as Professor
Cross notes, the provision has not been implemented in any
consistent way, and thus the "full promise" of the provision has
54
not been achieved.
Implementation of a constitutional guarantee, of course,
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See, e.g., In re M.E.M., 195 Mont. 329, 635 P.2d 1313 (1981).
53. Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 236 Mont. 44, 58, 769 P.2d 684,
693 (1989).
54. Symposium CD, supra note 43 (comments by panelist Professor Ray Cross).
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may be achieved through statutes that impose enforceable
duties upon states and their agencies, and may depend upon
funding appropriations and even litigation to secure the full
extent of the right. In 1999, Montana enacted House Bill 528 as
a way to implement this constitutional provision. 55 This statute
reflects Dorothy Eck's vision endorsing cultural pluralism but is
also quite consistent with the "antidiscrimination" approach.
Montana State Representative Carol Juneau, who resides on the
Blackfeet Indian Reservation in Montana, introduced House Bill
528 to encourage public school districts, especially those on or
near Indian reservations, to ensure that certified teaching
personnel have an understanding of the history, culture, and
contemporary contributions of Montana's Indian people. 56 The
preamble to House Bill 528 cites Article X, Section 1(2) as
recognizing "the distinct and unique cultural heritage of
American Indians" and as expressing the state's "commitment to
preserve that cultural integrity through education."5 7 The
preamble also cites a 1995 study, which determined that public
school districts, including those on or near Indian reservations,
do not recognize the special cultural heritage of American
Indians within their school curricula.58 That, along with the
lack of American Indian teachers and school administrators,
resulted in a lack of cultural awareness among non-Indian
students. 59 Finally, the preamble recognizes that "the history of
Montana and the current problems of the state cannot be
adequately understood and the problems cannot be addressed
unless both Indians and non-Indians have an understanding of
the history, culture, and contemporary contributions of
Montana's Indian people." 60
This law encourages both Indian and non-Indian citizens of
Montana to learn about the distinctive and unique heritage of
American Indians in a culturally responsive manner. In that
sense, although the law might be misconstrued as requiring only
that Indian students should be taught about their own culture
and history, it really requires all people to understand the
history of tribal and state interactions, as well as to appreciate
the cultural distinctiveness of Native peoples.
State
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

H.B. 528, 56th Leg. (Mont. 1999).
Cross, supranote 47, at 969,
Mont. H.B. 528.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Representative Carol Juneau believes that if all people
understood "the relationship of this country to Indian nations,"
it would be "easier to find solutions" to the problems that
confront contemporary communities, such as land and water
rights. 61 Toward that end, section 1 of the bill declares "it is the
constitutionally declared policy of this state to recognize the
distinct and unique cultural heritage of American Indians and to
be committed in its educational goals to the preservation of their
cultural heritage." 62 The bill encourages every local educational
agency to work with those Indian tribes that are in "close
proximity" when providing instruction, implementing an
educational goal, or adopting an educational rule to include
specific information on the cultural heritage and contemporary
contributions of Montana's Indian people.
Section two defines American Indian studies as "instruction
pertaining to the history, traditions, customs, beliefs, ethics, and
contemporary affairs of American Indians, particularly Indian
tribal groups in Montana." 63 "Instruction" is comprehensively
defined to include both the formal course of study offered by an
educational institution, as well as "in-service trainings" offered
by the superintendent, school district, or professional
educational organizations. 64 Under section three of the bill, local
school districts may require their certified teaching personnel to
complete a course of instruction in American Indian Studies. 65
This statute reflects a broad commitment to cultural
pluralism and specifically recognizes the value of Native
American cultural integrity within contemporary society. The
statutory language is fairly general with respect to the duties to
be imposed upon the state. Thus, the full articulation of the
statute may depend upon litigation that tests out the
constitutional language in Article X, Section 1(2) interpreted in
light of Subsections 1 and 3 which guarantee "equality of
educational opportunity" and impose a mandatory duty upon the
state to provide funding in an equitable manner. 66
The effective implementation of the statute clearly depends

61. Todd Struckman, Spirit of the Law, MISSOULA INDEPENDENT, Aug. 29, 2002,
available at www.missoulanews.com/Archives/News.asp?no=2687 (last visited Feb. 7,
2003).
62. Mont. H.B. 528.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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upon many factors, such as funding for new programs and
materials, and a commitment to developing new educational
policies and curricula. 67 Native educator, Julie Cajune, sees
funding as a major problem. 68 She. notes that House Bill 528
was intended to "call the conscience of the state" to what it had
already pledged to do through Article X, Section 2.69 However,
without legislative appropriations to implement the law, the
promise has been somewhat hollow. 70 She further observes that
the legislation does not offer any "special rights," it merely
attempts to make the existing system equitable, and in that
71
sense, it is a core requirement of Article X as a whole.
Attorney Jeffrey Weldon believes that implementation of the
statute rests upon the trustees of each school district, but that
the state Board of Public Education should generate uniform
standards for implementation (e.g., a uniform curriculum) so
that the quality of education is consistent throughout the
72
state.
Despite these challenges, the Montana constitutional
provision and its related statute both speak to a developing
notion of tribal-state relationships that is dynamic and
interactive. Accordingly, these provisions are futuristic and hold
promise for change.
The only other state constitutional
provision to protect Native culture is quite different. Section 7
of the Hawaii Constitution states that "[t]he State reaffirms and
shall protect all rights, customarily and traditionally exercised
for subsistence, cultural and religious purposes and possessed by
ahupua'a tenants who are descendants of Native Hawaiians who
inhabited the Hawaiian islands prior to 1778, subject to the
73
right of the State to regulate such rights."
The 1978 Constitutional Convention Committee on
Hawaiian Affairs added this section to reaffirm the customary
and traditionally exercised rights of Native Hawaiians, while

67. See Struckman, supra note 61.
68. Symposium CD, supra note 43 (comments by panelist Julie Cajune).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Symposium CD, supra note 43 (comments by panelist Jeffrey Weldon).
According to Mr. Weldon, who serves as Chief Legal Counsel for the Montana Office of
Public Instruction, the legislative appropriation for the statute has ranged from a high of
$91,000 in FY 2001 to a low of $43,000 in FY 2002. These minimal appropriations have
not been sufficient to support the staff or projects necessary to implement the statute.
73. HAW. CONST. art. XII, § 7.
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giving the state the power to regulate those rights. 74 Lawful
occupants of a traditional area or "ahupua'a" may, for the
purposes of practicing native Hawaiian customs and traditions,
enter undeveloped lands within the ahupua'a to gather these
items.7 5 Under Hawaiian case law, it is a defense to a criminal
charge of trespass if a defendant establishes: (1) that she meets
the definition of a "native Hawaiian," (2) that the claimed right
is constitutionally protected as a "customary or traditional
native Hawaiian practice," and (3) that the exercise of the right
took place on "undeveloped or less than fully developed
76
property."
The Hawaii Constitution protects the traditional, customary
and subsistence rights of Native people, and therefore reaffirms
cultural pluralism. However, it clearly establishes the superior
authority of the state government, and conditions the Native
Hawaiian peoples' rights by the status of the land as developed
or undeveloped. The Hawaii Constitution represents an attempt
to accommodate cultural preservation with development, which
may not be supportive of Native self-determination. The policy
agenda is set by the state, and the Native people are protected
in certain customary uses, to the extent that these do not
infringe upon state interests. Nor is it apparent that this
provision calls for the type of cultural education of non-Native
people that is considered important under the Montana
Constitution.
The promise of the Montana constitutional provision
appears to be a truly equal relationship between distinctive
sovereign governments and their citizens, who daily must
engage in reciprocal and interactive relationships with one
another. The articulation of rights in Article X will depend upon
a moral and legal commitment to ensure "equality of educational
opportunity" for Native and non-Native citizens. The next
section of this article examines the legal framework for Native
rights to education and cultural heritage which may inform that
understanding.

74. Pele Def. Fund v. Paty, 73 Haw. 578, 619, 837 P.2d 1247, 1271 (Haw. 1992),
cert. denied, 507 U.S. 918 (1993).
75. Id.
76. State v. Hanapi, 89 Haw. 177, 185-186, 970 P.2d 485, 493-494 (1998).
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III. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR NATIVE RIGHTS TO EDUCATION
AND CULTURAL HERITAGE

According to Professor Raymond Cross, Article X, Section 1
guarantees equality of opportunity to all students and is
designed to achieve a "truly integrated and quality education for
every student."7 7 Professor Cross notes that the provision was
enacted against a backdrop of segregated education for Indians
in Montana. Segregation, he says, ultimately ended as a
function of economics. 78 However, the legacy of segregationinequality of opportunity-has persisted. 79
Today, Indian
students disproportionately bear the burdens of inequality, as
evidenced by high dropout rates among Indian children in
Montana. Professor Cross perceives education as much more
than a "transmission of information."8 0 "What you transmit," he
says, is "a sense of self-confidence and self-esteem," and a "moral
and ethical foundation" for citizenship and for leadership. 8 ' This
is why the commitment to "equality of educational opportunity"
82
is so fundamentally important.
Thus, the guarantees of Article X, Section 1 of the Montana
Constitution are best understood against the policy framework
that has guided Native education and the preservation of Native
cultural heritage. This section of the article focuses on the
historical federal policies toward Native education and Native
cultures which undergird contemporary policies in these areas.
A. Native American Education
The federal government has long pledged to provide
educational opportunities for Native peoples. In the Northwest
Ordinance of 1787, the United States promised to provide a

77. Symposium CD, supra note 43 (comments by panelist Professor Ray Cross). In
this section of the article, I have relied extensively on the comments of Professor Cross at
the Symposium as well as his excellent law review article on American Indian
Education. See Raymond Cross, American Indian Education: The Terror History and the
Nation's Debt to the Indian Peoples, 21 U. ARK. LIrTLE ROCK L. REV. 941 (1999).
Professor Cross is one of the rare scholars who has carefully considered the legal, social
and moral implications of this issue, and his work will be instrumental to the ultimate
articulation of the rights secured by Article X,.Section 1 of the Montana Constitution.
78. Symposium CD, supra note 43 (comments by panelist Professor Ray Cross).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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suitable education for American Indian peoples.8 3
This
guarantee was implemented through many Indian treaties, as
well as statutory and regulatory provisions. Over 110 Indian
treaties provide that the federal government shall provide an
education to the members of the signatory tribes. 84 In the late
1860s and early 1870s, these provisions generally called for the
federal government to provide schools for "every 30 students
that could be induced or compelled to attend them."8 5 The tribal
leaders contemplated "reservation Indian schools that would
blend traditional Indian education with the needed non-Indian
skills that would allow their members to adapt to the
reservation way of life."8 6
Until the 1870s, the federal
government allowed American religious denominations and
their cognate missionary societies to provide education to Indian
peoples.8 7 However, the pledge to provide a federally funded
education to Native peoples suffered from Congress' refusal to
make the needed educational appropriations and from the shift
in federal policy regarding Indian education.
In the late 19th century, federal policy shifted to favor offreservation boarding schools to educate Native youth.8 8 Federal
policymakers believed that this was the most efficient means to
assimilate Indian people into non-Indian society, which would
both open tribal resources to non-Indian ownership and free the
government of its financial burden to care for its Indian "wards."
The boarding school system did not achieve these goals to the
satisfaction of federal policymakers, and in the 1930s, with the
rise of the New Deal Policy, which favored enhanced selfgovernance, federal policy shifted again to favor the integration
of American Indian children into the public school system. This
became the BIA's educational policy from the 1930s to the
1970s. 89 "The Johnson-O'Malley Act of 1934 (JOM) authorized
the Secretary of Interior to contract with 'any state, university,
college or with any appropriate state or private corporation,
agency, or institution, for the education of Indians in such state

83.

Cross, supra note 47, at 950 & n.37.

84.
Id. at 950 n.39 (citing to DAVID H. DEJONG, PROMISES OF THE PAST: A HISTORY
OF INDIAN EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES 3-21 (1993)).

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 950.
Id.
Id. at 950-951.
Cross, supra note 47, at 944.
Id. at 960-961.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2003

25

224

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

Montana Law Review, Vol. 64 [2003], Iss. 1, Art. 8

Vol. 64

or territory.' 90
Not surprisingly, the states were generally enthusiastic
about accepting federal subsidies for Indian education.
However, they were in most cases unwilling to provide the
"required cultural support services that would allow Indian
children to succeed in the public school setting."91 In fact, some
commentators assert that public schools often misused the
funds, applying them to the general educational program needs
of the school, rather than to the Indian children who were the
intended beneficiaries. 92
Thus, although federal funding
through the JOM Program, as well as "impact aid" programs
resulted in the transfer of thousands of Indian children into the
public school system, it did not succeed in meeting the
educational needs of American Indian students. BIA educators
argued that the quality of education provided by federal schools
for Indian children was superior to that provided by local public
schools. 93 However, both school systems suffered from the same
disregard of the need for Indian parental and community
94
involvement.
Two federal studies ultimately concluded the JOM program
never resulted in its intended educational benefits to Indian
children. With the acknowledged failure of both the state and
federal educational systems to deliver an adequate education to
Indian children, attention turned in the 1970s to a new policy
reflective of the goals of tribal self-determination. This new
policy envisioned American Indian education as a shared
responsibility of federal, state and tribal governments. 95
Professor Raymond Cross suggests, "reconstructing Indian
education in the 21st century requires the fulfillment of an old
covenant between the Indian peoples and the federal
government." 96 According to Professor Cross, this "covenant"
imposes duties on each of the three governments. 97 The state
governments "should view public school education as requiring
the fair and accurate representation of American Indian peoples
90. Id. (quoting Act of Apr. 16, 1934, 49 Stat. 1458).
91. Id. at 961.
92. Id. (referring to Margaret Szasz, a scholar on the JOM program, who suggests
that during the mid-1960s funds designated for educational programs for Indian children
were instead used for the general educational programs in public schools).
93. Id. at 961-962.
94. Cross, supra note 47, at 962.
95. Id. at 963.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 963-964.
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within their history and social studies curriculum for the benefit
of Indian and non-Indian students alike."9 8 This goal is well
reflected in the language of Article X, Section 1(2) of the
Montana Constitution and in House Bill 528, but it clearly
requires some commitment beyond a mere hortatory statement
about what ought to be done.
Professor Cross next observes that the federal government
"should view the education of the American Indians as its
continuing trust duty that extends from the K-12 grades
through higher education for qualified Indian students."99
Presumably this requires the federal government to ensure the
quality of education that Native people receive, rather than
merely delegating its responsibility to the states. Cross further
asserts that the tribal governments "should view the education
of their tribal members as a fundamental goal of tribal selfdetermination, co-equal with their responsibility to protect and
preserve their natural and cultural resources." 10 0 Thus, in order
to fully implement Article X, Section 1(2), the tribal
governments have a responsibility to transmit the considerable
"funds of knowledge" they possess about their own unique
histories and cultures to their children, and to share this
knowledge, to the extent appropriate, with non-Indians as
well. 10' The responsibility to maintain the cultural integrity of
the tribe rests, in the first instance, with the tribes themselves.
Thus, as Article X, Section 1(2) envisions, education and the
preservation of cultural heritage are twin aspects of "equal
educational opportunity" for Native people.
This point is
perhaps best appreciated in the context of an 1887 case, In re
Can-ah-couqua.10 2 In that case, an Alaska federal district court
denied the habeas corpus petition of an Alaskan Native woman
who sought to regain custody of her eight year old son from a
government-funded Presbyterian mission school. 10 3 The court
reasoned that the boy's best interests were met by having him in
the mission school and that the mother's interests could be

98. Id. at 964.
99. Cross, supra note 47, at 964.
100. Id.
101. Symposium CD, supranote 43 (comments by panelist Julie Cajune stating that
the responsibility to provide cultural education rests primarily upon the tribes, and that
they must share in the commitment to provide the "best teaching to Indian and nonIndian children").
102. 29 F. 687 (D. Alaska 1887).
103. Id.
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protected by allowing her limited rights to visit her son. 10 4
Professor Allison Dussias uses this case to "illustrate[ ] the
effects on individual Native Americans of the nineteenthcentury alliance between the federal government and religious
groups to 'civilize and Christianize' the Indians." 10 5 In the words
of the federal district court in In re Can-ah-couqua,"the policy of
the government is to aid these mission schools in the great
Christian enterprise of rescuing from lives of barbarism and
savagery these Indian children, and conferring upon them the
benefits of an educated civilization." 0 6 Thus, the legacy of
American educational policy toward Native people is one that
suppresses Native cultural heritage and strips Native children
of the identities and tools necessary to flourish and grow.
B. Native American Cultural Heritage
In order to understand the value of heritage resources to
Native people, it is necessary to consider both the tangible and
intangible aspects of these resources. "Cultural" or "heritage"
resources include the standard categories of historical and
archaeological resources, as well as the cultural and religious
practices of particular communities, objects that have cultural or
religious significance to those communities, and even cultural
uses of natural resources. Within most Native traditions, the
dichotomies between "culture" and "religion," between "belief'
and "practice," and between "natural" resources and "cultural"
resources do not exist. A mountain can be "sacred" within
indigenous peoples' traditions, as well as a medicine bundle or
an herb or a plant. All of these components may be necessary to
transmit the culture from generation to generation.
Of course, Native cultures have been dominated for
centuries by government policies designed to affirmatively
destroy Native traditions, as well as by legal structures that
have not been inclusive of Native rights. Native cultures and
religions have persisted, of course, demonstrating the tenacity of
Native people and their commitment to cultural survival. To
achieve "equity" with respect to the goals of cultural
preservation, however, requires some familiarity with the

104. Id. at 689.
105. Allison M. Dussias, Ghost Dance and Holy Ghost: The Echoes of Nineteenth
Century Christianization Policy in Twentieth Century Native American Free Exercise
Cases, 49 STAN. L. REV. 773, 774 (1997).
106. 29 F. at 688.
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history of these laws and policies, as well as an understanding of
what contemporary tools are available to correct these past
injustices.
From 1869 to 1882, the federal government executed its
Peace Policy, designed to civilize and Christianize American
Indian people for their ultimate incorporation into the citizenry
of America. 10 7 The Peace Policy looked to religious groups and
individuals to formulate and administer Indian policy. The most
significant structural features of this policy were the creation of
a Board of Indian Commissioners, comprised of ten Christian
philanthropists, and the allotment of Indian agencies to
religious groups. 0 8
In addition, the federal government
expanded its aid to the Indian mission schools. 0 9
The federal government ended direct funding of sectarian
contract schools in the 1890s, although it continued to provide
religious instruction in the government Indian schools on a
"nondenominational" basis in order to avoid Establishment
Clause problems. 10
In addition to these attempts to
Christianize Indian people, the government also implemented
directives to destroy Native American religions by banning
traditional dances, ceremonies, and other practices. In April
1883, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs distributed a set of
"Rules for Indian Courts" that defined several "Indian Offenses"
including "participation in the sun dance, scalp dance, and the
war dance.""'
The rules also prohibited the activities of
medicine men, the distribution or destruction of property that
accompanied certain ceremonies, as well as mourning rituals.
The government's attempts to ban Native religion peaked with
its efforts to suppress the Ghost Dance, a peaceful messianic
religious movement that swept through the Plains tribes in the
late 1800s and was designed to resurrect the strength of
traditional Native cultures. The movement ended tragically
with the massacre of over 300 men, women and children at
112
Wounded Knee.
However, these government policies were not merely a
vestige of misguided 19th century reformist efforts. In the
107. Dussias, supra note 105, at 777-79.
108. Id. at 779
109. Id.
110. Id. at 786.
111. 1883 COMMR'S OF INDIAN AFFAIRS ANN. REP. XIV-XV reprinted in Dussias,
supra note 105, at 773, 852.
112. Dussias, supra note 105, at 794-799.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2003

29

228

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

Montana Law Review, Vol. 64 [2003], Iss. 1, Art. 8

Vol. 64

1920s, the Indian agents assigned to the New Mexico Pueblos
convinced the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to issue a circular
placing conditions and limitations on Pueblo dances and
ceremonies and requiring attendance at church and Sunday
11-3
school by all Indian students at government boarding schools.
The Pueblos vigorously resisted these policies, asserting their
rights to religious liberty, and enlisted the support of John
Collier, a liberal policymaker who ultimately became the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs. In 1934, Commissioner Collier
ended the overt government suppression of Native religion by
issuing orders that ensured Native American religious liberty
114
and curtailed missionary activity at the Indian schools.
As Professor Dussias demonstrates, however,
the
suppression of Native religion has continued into the 20th
century in a series of Supreme Court cases that failed to accord
equal respect to Native religions and used categorical
approaches modeled upon Judeo-Christian religions to deny the
free exercise rights of Native litigants. 115 For example, in Lyng
v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, the
Supreme Court found that the Free Exercise Clause did not
prohibit the United States Forest Service from constructing a
road through a federally owned wilderness area that had
traditionally been used for religious purposes by several Native
groups. 116 Despite a finding that the road construction would
virtually destroy the ability of the Indian people to practice their
religion, Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, held that
the First Amendment must "apply to all citizens alike, and it
can give none of them a veto over public programs that do not
prohibit the free exercise of religion." 1 7
By treating the
government's
road project
as
a
completely
neutral
administrative decision regarding use of federally owned land,
the Court was able to circumvent use of the compelling interest
test altogether.
Justice O'Connor's opinion indicates that
majority values and interests take precedence on "public lands"
regardless of the competing values and interests of minority
cultures. To find in favor of the Indian plaintiffs in this case,
she claimed, would be to require "de facto beneficial ownership

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 800-803.
Id. at 805.
Id. at 805-833.
485 U.S. 439 (1988).
Id. at 452.
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of some rather spacious tracts of public property."11 8 To Justice
O'Connor, this is not a "constitutional" issue, but a "governance"
issue that facilitates decision-making in a pluralistic society.
Thus, as the dissenting justices noted, the Court essentially held
that "federal land-use decisions that render the practice of a
given religion impossible do not burden that religion in a
manner cognizable under the Free Exercise Clause." 119
Despite Justice O'Connor's protests to the contrary, the
Lyng decision supported the Court's subsequent opinion in
Employment Division, Oregon Department of Human Resources
v. Smith, which held that the Free Exercise Clause does not pose
a bar to state prohibitions on sacramental peyote use by Native
Americans. 20 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, declined
to apply the compelling interest test to the "government's ability
to enforce generally applicable prohibitions of socially harmful
conduct" through its criminal laws. 121 An individual's obligation
to conform to such a law should not be conditioned upon "the
law's coincidence with his religious beliefs."1 22 Such a result,
wrote Justice Scalia, "contradicts both constitutional tradition
1 23
and common sense."
Justice Scalia's reading of "constitutional tradition" is
majoritarian in focus. According to Justice Scalia, any society
using a compelling interest test as a means of measuring
governmental authority to infringe upon individual's religious
interests would be "courting anarchy."1 24 Moreover, he claimed:
"that danger increases in direct proportion to the society's
diversity of religious beliefs, and its determination to coerce or
suppress none of them."1 25 Although his analysis is framed in
terms of liberal tolerance and equality, Justice Scalia
acknowledged that the accommodation of religious practices,
once taken out of the constitutional interpretation of the courts,
could only be addressed through the "political process." Justice
Scalia further admitted that this would disadvantage "religious
practices that are not widely engaged in," but claimed "that
unavoidable consequence of democratic government must be

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at 453.
Id. at 459.
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
Id. at 885.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 888.
Smith, 494 U.S. at 888.
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preferred to a system in which each conscience is a law unto
itself or in which judges weigh the social importance of all laws
26
against the centrality of all religious beliefs.'
The view of religious freedom that emerges from Smith and
Lyng treats cultural pluralism as a matter of legislative
"accommodation," rather than a constitutional requirement. By
failing to consider tribal religious interests as analogous to
individual free exercise claims, the Supreme Court facilitated
the need for special legislation protecting Native American
religious practice.
The American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978
(AIRFA) specifies that it is "the policy of the United States to
protect and preserve for American Indians their inherent right
of freedom to believe, express, and exercise" their traditional
religions. 127
Although this language suggests that Native
religions should receive statutory as well as constitutional
protection, the Supreme Court has failed to accept this
interpretation. Rather, the Court has held that the AIRFA does
not offer any legally enforceable protection for Native religious
practices. 128 Subsequent action was necessary to make AIRFA's
provisions binding and enforceable.
Congress amended the
AIRFA in 1994 to provide legal protection for Native Americans
1 29
using peyote for "bona fide traditional ceremonial purposes."
In 1996, President Clinton signed an executive order requiring
federal agencies to accommodate access to and ceremonial use of
Indian sacred sites by Native American practitioners "to the
extent practicable, permitted by law, and not clearly
inconsistent with essential agency functions. '' 130
The AIRFA also inspired a statute that provides enforceable
protection for Native American human remains and cultural
objects.
The Native American Graves Protection and
Repatriation Act of 1990 (NAGPRA), prohibits the trade,
transport or sale of Native American human remains.
Additionally, the Act directs federal agencies and federally
funded museums and institutions to identify such remains and
specific categories of cultural objects in their possession and to
126. Id. at 890.
127.
42 U.S.C. § 1996 (2002).
128. See, e.g., Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439,
455 (1988) (stating "[n]
owhere in the [AIRFA] is there so much as a hint of any intent to
create a cause of action or any judicially enforceable individual rights").
129. 42 U.S.C. § 1996a(b)(1) (2002).
130. Exec. Order No. 13,007, 61 Fed. Reg. 26,771 (May 24, 1996).
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repatriate them to the tribes. 13 1 The NAGPRA is an exceedingly
important statute designed to remediate a bitter history of
human rights violations against Native people, including the
looting of ancestral burial grounds and the misappropriation of
Native cultural patrimony, often by force or fraud. 132 Until the
passage of the NAGPRA, Native claims against museums for the
return of ancestral human remains and cultural objects were
routinely denied. The museums generally argued that they had
the legal right to possess such items, and moreover, that they
had an "ethical obligation to retain them for scientific inquiry
and historic preservation."1 33 Many sets of Native American
human remains were in fact taken from battlefields and burial
scaffolds under the authority of an 1868 Surgeon General's
directive to Army Personnel requesting the collection of Indian
skulls and other body parts for scientific inquiry. 3 4 Under both
federal and state law, Native American human remains received
far different treatment than human remains disinterred from
Christian cemeteries. 35 And the question of rights to Native
cultural patrimony was blurred by the "property" claims of non36
Indian artifact collectors and museums.
These federal statutes and executive orders protecting
Native American cultures and religions serve as an
acknowledgment of past wrongs and an attempt to remediate
the harm by providing affirmative and enforceable protection for
aspects of Native culture. As such, they set the tone for state
policies which serve the same goals and interests. The next
section of this article focuses on the challenges of differentiated
citizenship under state law, again looking to the provisions
within Article X, Section 1 of the Montana Constitution for
131. 25 U.S.C. § 3001-3013 (2002).
132. See generally Walter R. Echo-Hawk, Museum Rights vs. Indian Rights:
Guidelines for Assessing Competing Legal Interests in Native Cultural Resources, 14
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 437 (1986); Jack F. Trope & Walter R. Echo-Hawk, The
Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act: Background and Legislative
History, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 35 (1992).
133. See Sarah Harding, Justifying Repatriation of Native American Cultural
Property, 72 IND. L.J. 723, 730 (1997).
134. Id. at 727 & n.12.
135. See, e.g., Wana the Bear v. Community Const., Inc., 180 Cal. Rptr. 423 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1982) (finding no legal protection under state law for Native American burial
site).
136. See, e.g., Onondaga Nation v. Thacher, 61 N.Y.S. 1027 (Sup. Ct. 1899), affd 62
N.E. 1098 (N.Y. 1901) (rejecting Onondaga Nation's claim of ownership to four wampum
belts). The Onondaga Nation persisted in its claim, and 75 years later, was successful in
negotiating the return of the belts. See Trope & Echohawk, supra note 132, at 43 n.30.
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guidance on future directions.
IV. THE CHALLENGES OF DIFFERENTIATED CITIZENSHIP: FUTURE
DIRECTIONS

What principles should guide tribal-state relationships in
the contemporary era? To the extent that a state constitution
contains specific provisions relating to Native peoples, what are
the implications for the constitutional relationship of the two
sets of governments? Are these provisions to be considered a
means of providing "equal citizenship" to Native peoples, given
the histories of discrimination and dispossession that have often
characterized Native and non-Native encounters? Or are these
provisions recognition of a new and developing political
relationship between sovereigns that is built on principles of
respect and autonomy?
Article X, Section 1(2) of the Montana Constitution engages
these and related questions, against the backdrop of over two
centuries of federal policy designed to structure the assimilation
of Native peoples. Inherent in the language of this provision is
the premise that Native cultural integrity is an important value
in contemporary society, and that both Native and non-Native
citizens must understand the unique political and cultural
attributes of tribes and their members. Tribal sovereignty is an
enduring reality in American society and must be factored into
the emerging domestic federalism that will structure our
Article X forges a new type of
collective future.
"constitutionalism," rooted in the reciprocal and mutual
interests of all of the citizens that live within Montana. In the
text that follows, I will address some of the principles that might
be used to structure future relationships among Indian nations
and the State, and between Indian and non-Indian citizens of
Montana.
Principlesof Constitutionalism
Traditionally, "constitutionalism" has been considered as a
"way of political life in which a people constitute themselves as a
community, conducting their affairs in accordance with
principles and through prescribed forms,
fundamental
and
primary rules of obligation." 13 7 The political
procedures,

137.

Herman Belz, Affirmative Action and American Equality: A Constitutionalist

Perspective, in LIBERTY UNDER THE LAW: AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM, YESTERDAY,
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community is comprised of citizens, who may come from
different cultures and ethnicities, but who all ascribe to a set of
uniform "ideals" of civic obligation. For example, according to
William Galston, responsible citizenship requires four types of
"civic virtues": (1) general virtues, such as courage, loyalty and
the will to obey the law; (2) social virtues, such as independence
and the ability to keep an open mind; (3) economic virtues,
including a strong work ethic and ability to adapt to economic
and technological change; and (4) political virtues, including the
capacity to discern and respect the rights of others and the
willingness to engage in public discourse. 138
The irony with respect to this vision of constitutionalism at
a state level is that tribal existence has long been dependent
upon a sharp separation from that of the surrounding state. 139
The perceived "detribalization" of an Indian nation through
cultural, political, or geographic "assimilation" with the
surrounding state population has been used by many courts to
deny Indian nations their rights to land and sovereignty. 40
Thus, the more nuanced vision of constitutionalism that will
structure the future of Indian and non-Indian citizens must be
cognizant of the differentiated citizenship of these constituent
members. In other words, to the extent that contemporary state
constitutions advocate pluralism-as they should-this must
acknowledge the political and cultural pluralism of Native
citizens.

TODAY, AND TOMORROW 209, 211 (Kenneth L. Grasso & Cecilia Rodriquez Castillo eds.,
2d ed. 1998).
138. Will Kymlicka & Wayne Norman, Citizenship in Culturally Diverse Societies:
Issues, Contexts, Concepts, in CITIZENSHIP IN DIVERSE SOCIETIES 7 (Will Kymlicka &
Wayne Norman eds., 2000).
139. See Rebecca Tsosie, Tribalism, Constitutionalism and Cultural Pluralism:
Where do Indigenous Peoples fit within Civil Society?, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. (forthcoming
2003).
140. See, e.g., United States v. Cisna, 25 F. Cas. 4222 (C.C.D. Ohio 1835) (No. 14,
795) (holding that assimilation of the Wyandott tribe into surrounding white population
justified suspension of federal law on the Wyandott Reservation sufficient to permit state
jurisdiction over a criminal act by a non-Indian against an Indian); Brendale v.
Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989) (holding
that the tribe did not have zoning authority within portion of its reservation that had
been opened to non-Indian settlement and which did not have a distinctively "Indian
character"); Mashpee Tribe v. Town of Mashpee, 447 F. Supp. 940 (D.Mass. 1978), affd
Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp., 592 F.2d 575 (1st Cir. 1979) (holding that historic
Mashpee Tribe had become "detribalized" through racial, cultural and political
assimilation with non-Indians and thus could not maintain an action for dispossession of
land under federal Nonintercourse acts).
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Principlesof Pluralismand Multiculturalism
The place of Indian nations within contemporary society
raises issues of cultural and political pluralism. Contemporary
of
to the challenges
issues
these
relate
theorists
"multiculturalism" in modern democracies, focusing on the
rights and status of "ethnocultural minorities in multi-ethnic
societies," and the virtues and responsibilities of democratic
citizenship. 141 There are, of course, many tensions between
these two areas of civic life in multicultural societies, and
philosophers differ as to whether these are ultimately
irreconcilable aspects of multiculturalism.
As groups, American Indian nations within the United
States are considered "domestic" sovereigns. Indian nations
enjoy both political and cultural sovereignty as an aspect of their
As individuals,
inherent status as separate governments.
Native people in the United States possess citizenship in the
larger nations that colonized their lands, with all of the rights
that citizenship entails yet they also possess citizenship within
their indigenous nations. This "dual citizenship" justifies a set
of unique rights, which distinguish indigenous people from
This often
citizens belonging to other cultural groups.
who
associate
citizens,
non-Indian
among
resentment
engenders
such "special" rights with "affirmative action" and argue that all
citizens should have the same rights as equals under the
Constitution.
According to Professor Raymond Cross, the efforts of
Montana educators to implement the constitutional and
statutory directives regarding Native American culture and
education have been legislatively challenged "by those who
consider American Indian education preferences illegal or
immoral."1 42 Professor Cross notes that these challenges have
failed because the state legislature has concluded that
investment in American Indian education "makes good practical
as well as legal sense." 43 Thus, to the extent that Article X,
Section 1(2) does require "special" rights for Native people, that
is a conscious choice of the Montana Legislature and presumably
the only way to guarantee a truly "equal" educational

141. See Will Kymlicka & Wayne Norman, Citizenship in Culturally Diverse
Societies: Issues, Contexts, Concepts, in CITIZENSHIP IN DIVERSE SOCIETIES, supra note
138, at 1.
142. Cross, supranote 47, at 968.
143. Id.
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opportunity for Native Americans.
For example, Article X, Section 1(2) specifies that the state
be committed to the preservation of Native cultural integrity.
This provision is uniquely designed to accommodate the
interests of Native citizens in preserving their cultural context.
No other ethnic group has the same interests or status.
However, the provision also entails a responsibility to inform
non-Native citizens about Native culture and the unique aspects
of Native cultural heritage.
This provision recognizes the
inherent differences in the way that Indian and non-Indian
people view cultural heritage.
The American legal system looks at heritage resources as
belonging to our collective "past." Many Native cultures do not
share the same concept of the past. Euro-Americans routinely
distinguish between the category of "history" and that of
"prehistory," and assign different levels of legal protection for
objects depending upon which category they belong to. For
example, scientists routinely claim that "prehistoric" human
remains should be widely available for study, even if "historic"
remains that can be traced to modern day descendants are not.
Many Native peoples, such as the Navajos, do not have a word
that describes "prehistory." Human history is continuous for
many Native cultures, and many believe the spirits of the
Ancestors continue to live and guide people of today.
These different cultural understandings of the "past" are
illustrated by the findings of a comprehensive study on the
popular uses of history in American life (including white, black,
Indian, and Mexican people) by historians Rosenzweig and
Thelen. They note that most white Americans have an intense
interest in the immediate past of their particular families, which
manifests itself, for example, in genealogy searches and family
histories.'"
White Americans place some value on their
Nation's past, although it is not the most important value to
them. To most white Americans, the past of "America" includes
the history of black, white, Mexican, and Native American
citizens and "belongs" to all "Americans." The past of America is
therefore appropriately collected and documented by and in
museums and historical societies.
In comparison, Rosenzweig and Thelen note that Native
Americans (in this study, members of the Lakota Sioux Tribe)

144.
ROY ROSENZWEIG AND DAVID THELEN, THE PRESENCE OF THE PAST: POPULAR
USES OF HISTORY IN AMERICAN LIFE (1998).
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were "almost ten times as likely as white Americans to describe
ethnic/racial history as most important to them."145 The Oglala
Sioux participants perceived their own families as related in
very important ways to other members of the tribe, both living
and dead. "In the Lakota beliefs," said one participant, "we're
all basically related." The most important thing for children to
know, said another, is "who their people are, how they came to
be here, how we're all related." Consequently, the participants
tended to cite their relationship to prominent leaders from the
past, such as Red Cloud and Spotted Tail. Perhaps most telling
were the comments of one woman who said:
We all feel the spirit of our ancestors on a daily basis. When we
are all together, it is a really strong feeling. We have ceremonies
where we feed our ancestors. Invariably, everything we do has
connection to our ancestors. The Native American culture thrives
and lives by ritual because we're part 146
of this oral history, and
everything we do, we tie it into the past.

To the majority of white Americans, then, family histories
are the immediate concern of living members. The Nation's
history, on the other hand, is a common resource that belongs to
all Americans and is amenable to "stewardship" for the benefit
of the public. To Native Americans, it is incomprehensible that
one would seek to disassociate one's family from the larger tribal
Nation or treat the Ancestors differently from living tribal
members. The collective responsibility for the Ancestors resides
in their descendants, contemporary Native people.
This is one reason why it is so important to involve Native
educators in structuring curricula that will transmit this
information about Native cultural heritage. Just recently, a
colleague of mine shared a story that illustrates this. Her eight
year old Navajo grandson had checked a book out of his local
school library on "Great Indian Leaders." A descendant of a
famous 19th century Navajo leader, he excitedly checked to see
if his ancestor was listed among them. However, his excitement
soon turned to dismay when he read the text about leaders such
as Geronimo and Sitting Bull. The author referred to them as
"savage" and "bloodthirsty," hardly qualities of "leadership." He
sadly told his grandmother that he was glad that their family
was not represented in such a book. Her question to me was
what could be done-legally or otherwise-to get such a book off
the shelves. To the extent that today's youth-Indian or non145.
146.

Id. at 162.
Id. at 163.
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Indian-are exposed to these ethnocentric misrepresentations
about history, we are all harmed. Clearly, we need to revisit the
functions of public education and instill a sense of responsibility
for what information is transmitted and how this occurs.
Principlesof Civic Virtue
One of the primary functions of public education is to
instruct young people in these principles of civic virtue so that
they might become contributing members of society. As the
court pointed out in Wisconsin v. Yoder, another function of
public education is to ensure that young people have a basic set
of skills to enter society as autonomous individuals who can
14 7
then choose an appropriate life plan.
However, in evaluating the obligations of a government to
promote civic obligation, it is also necessary to maintain a
certain level of deference to the needs of ethnic or cultural
communities that have different conceptions of civic virtue. For
example, in the Yoder case, Amish parents affirmatively rejected
public school instruction after age 16, claiming that this would
be inconsistent with their need to instill in their children the
appropriate values of community and family responsibility that
are unique to the Amish, and also to instruct them to commence
the agrarian lifestyle of that community. The Supreme Court
upheld the claim of the Amish parents that the state's
compulsory education law infringed upon their free exercise of
religion. The Supreme Court later described Yoder as a decision
that was based on both the free exercise clause and the parental
interest in directing the education of their children that was
protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
148
Amendment.
Article X, Section 1(2) of the Montana Constitution responds
to that pluralistic vision of civic virtue by providing that "the
state recognizes the distinct and unique cultural heritage of the
American Indians and is committed in its educational goals to
the preservation of their cultural integrity." This provision can
be interpreted as carrying out the government's obligation to
ensure that citizens "share" a sense of membership and
belonging in the political community of Montana. Thus, as
Representative Juneau notes, it is important to educate all
147.
148.
(1990).

406 U.S. 205 (1972).
Employment Div., Oregon Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 n.1
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citizens of Montana about the history of the state, about the
existence of the autonomous Indian nations that were ultimately
incorporated into the boundaries of the state, and their
continuing status as separate sovereigns with political rights to
engage in self-governance, economic development, and regulate
matters within their own jurisdiction. While early federal and
state policies focused on the assimilation of Native peoples into
the "dominant society," the Montana provision can be read as
the state's commitment to accept the differences between Indian
citizens and non-Indian citizens and to accommodate these
differences and provide education about the historic origin of the
differences and their continuing reality. In short, the obligation
to instruct citizens about the reality of "differentiated"
citizenship may be the primary function of the Montana
provision. "Civic virtue" may depend upon the ability of all
citizens-Indian and non-Indian-to understand the "history,
culture, and contemporary contributions of Montana's Indian
people."
Article X, Section 1(2) can also be read broadly to call for the
state to accommodate the distinctive cultures and traditions of
Indian nations in Montana; for example, by according
recognition of tribal rights to adjudicate the rights of Indian
children in dependency proceedings, tribal rights to water
resources, tribal language rights, and tribal rights to use of
"public lands" for cultural and traditional purposes.
Furthermore, the provision might well call for a new
relationship to be created between the state and the Indian
nations, which accords respect between sovereigns and pledges
the state's support for the continuing existence of each tribe as a
separate political and cultural entity within Montana.
Indeed, this interpretation is reflected in the recent
legislation enacted by the Montana Legislature requiring
repatriation of human remains and funerary objects that were
taken from burial sites prior to July 1, 1991, when the Human
14 9
Skeletal Remains and Burial Site Protection Act was enacted.
The Montana statute tracks the federal repatriation statute
(NAGPRA) and provides protection for burial grounds (whether
marked or unmarked) on state or private lands. The statute
provides a mechanism to repatriate such items to the tribal
group, lineal descendant, or next of kin who can establish

149.

MONT. CODE ANN. § 22-3-902 (2001).
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"cultural affiliation" to the remains or funerary objects. 150 In
support of this provision, the statute cites the Free Exercise
Clause of the United States Constitution and the Montana
Constitution, as well as the responsibility to "preserve the
cultural integrity of American Indian citizens recognized by the
state under Article X, [SIection 1(2) of the Montana
Constitution." In addition, the statute pledges to "protect the
right of privacy guaranteed to tribal groups, lineal descendants,
next of kin, agencies, or museums regarding the disclosure of
sacred or religious information to the full extent allowed by the
Montana Constitution."
Principlesof FundamentalRights
It is instructive that the Montana Legislature included
Article X, Section 1(2) along with the Free Exercise Clause and
the Privacy Clause of the Montana Constitution in support of
the repatriation legislation.
There are three primary
approaches to state constitutional interpretation. One is to
interpret the state constitution as tracking the requirements of
the federal constitution. Another is to interpret the state
constitution independently, but look to the federal constitution
for guidance. And the third approach is to interpret the state
constitution as completely autonomous, going above and beyond
the federal constitution in defining the applicable rights. In
enacting Article X, Section 1, the Montana Legislature appears
to have followed the third approach.
Unlike the federal
constitution, Article X, Section 1 of the Montana Constitution
appears to offer a right to education and to support the right of
Native American peoples to their culture.
The Supreme Court of the United States has not held that
publicly financed primary or secondary education is a
fundamental right. 15' Nor has it found educational inequality to
be a constitutional problem. In San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez, the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of a property tax system that financed primary
and secondary education in school districts in a manner that
150. Id.
151. The state may not, however, single out a class of children and deny them an
educational opportunity. In Plyler v. Doe, the Court invalidated a state statute which
denied public education to the children of illegally resident aliens, even though the Court
refused to find that education was a fundamental right or that illegal aliens were a class
of persons who merited close judicial scrutiny of laws that disadvantaged them. 457 U.S.
202 (1982).
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created large differences in the amount of money spent on the
education of individual children. 152
The Court found it
constitutionally
permissible
to
allocate
educational
opportunities based on the wealth of the school district in which
the child resided. The Court applied a minimal level of scrutiny,
which merely required the state legislature's' policies- to be
"reasonable," because the Court found that no suspect
classification or fundamental right was involved. The Court
held that there was no suspect classification since there was no
correlation in this case between district wealth and race, and the
Court refused to find that a publicly financed primary or
secondary education is a fundamental right.
The Montana Legislature has clearly rejected the federal
government's minimalist approach to educational rights. Article
X, Section 1 guarantees "equality of educational opportunity" to
"each person of the state," and mandates the state legislature to
"provide a basic system of free quality public elementary and
secondary schools."1 5 3 That approach is also extended to school
funding through the requirement that the legislature "shall fund
and distribute in an equitable manner to the school districts the
state's share of the cost of the basic elementary and secondary
1 54
school system."
Similarly, although the federal constitution does not contain
a right to culture, and indeed, the Court held in Yoder that the
Amish parents' cultural claims in that case were unprotected to
the extent that a religious practice was not also burdened, the
Montana Constitution appears to recognize Native peoples' right
to cultural integrity. "Culture" is an all-encompassing concept
that comprises the "material, spiritual, and artistic expression of
a group that defines itself' as a distinct culture, both according
to daily lived experience and according to practice and theory. 55
According to philosopher Ronald Dworkin, human culture has
"intrinsic value," as opposed to merely instrumental
importance. 156 We honor and protect cultures because they are
"communal products" of the type of enterprise that we consider

152.
153.

411 U.S. 1 (1973).
MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1(1), 1(3).

154.

MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1(3).

155. Jonathan Hart, Translatingand Resisting Empire: CulturalAppropriation and
Postcolonial Studies in BORROWED POWER: ESSAYS ON CULTURAL APPROPRIATION (Bruce
Ziff & Pratima V. Rao eds., 1997)
156.
RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION:
EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 70 (1994).
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important to human existence. 15 7 Moreover, people generally
consider it tragic when a "distinctive form of human culture,
58
especially a complex and interesting one, dies or languishes."
This, of course, tends not to be a problem for dominant cultures,
because those groups in power have the ability to sustain their
practices. However, worldwide, minority cultures are frequently
the targets of policies that either affirmatively suppress certain
key practices (e.g., language and religion) or fail to give them
due consideration, leading to the "inadvertent" extinction of a
practice. 1 59 This is one of the most important justifications for a
right to culture.
"Human beings have a right to culture-not just any
culture, but their own," argue Avishai Margalit and Moshe
Halbertal in their article "Liberalism and the Right to
Culture.' ' 60 This right rests on a conception of culture as "a
comprehensive way of life" belonging to an "encompassing
group, such as an ethnic, religious, or national group." 16 1 Under
this definition, the culture of an encompassing group comprises
virtually every aspect of the group's existence, including its
religions, activities and social relationships.
Culture is
expressed in a variety of ways, including "language, literary and
artistic traditions, music, customs, dress, festivals, [and]
62
ceremonies."1
That human beings have some sort of "right to culture"
appears to have garnered a wide enough acceptance to serve as
a basis for a principle of international human rights law. Article
27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
provides that: "[i]n those States in which ethnic, religious or
linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities

157. Id. at 78.
158. Id. at 72.
159. We see examples of these policies even in constitutional democracies such as
the United States. For example, "English only" initiatives intentionally suppress the use
of foreign languages within state institutions, and court decisions upholding bans on
practices such as peyote use by members of the Native American Church can have the
effect of suppressing minority religions. See, e.g., Employment Div., Oregon Dep't. of
Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (stating '[ilt may fairly be said that
leaving accommodation to the political process will place at a relative disadvantage those
religious practices that are not widely engaged in; but that unavoidable consequence of
democratic government must be preferred to a system in which each conscience is a law
unto itself or in which judges weigh the social importance of all laws against the
centrality of all religious beliefs").
160. 61 Soc. RES. 491 (1994).
161. Id. at 497-98.
162. Id. at 498.
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shall not be denied the right, in community with other members
of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice
163
their own religion, or to use their own language."
But what should a "right to culture" comprise? Margalit
and Halbertal claim that there are three primary levels to the
"right to culture." 164 The first is "the right to maintain a
comprehensive way of life within the larger society without
interference, and with only the limitation of the harm principle."
The second level adds the "right to recognition of the
community's way of life by the general society." The third level
includes "the right to support for the way of life by the state's
institutions so that the culture can flourish."
Under this interpretation, the right to Native cultural
integrity recognized by Article X, Section 1(2) can support a host
of statutory protections for Native cultural rights. To some
extent, these can complement those protections extended to
Native cultures by federal statutes, such as the NAGPRA, the
Peyote Act, and the Indian Arts and Crafts Act. Montana's
repatriation statute is a good example of this synergy. And
other states have passed statutes complimentary to the federal
166
Indian Arts and Crafts Act 165 and the Peyote Act.
The principles of constitutionalism, pluralism, civic virtue
and fundamental rights noted above represent only the
beginning of the intercultural dialogue that must accompany the
full implementation of the Montana constitutional provision
protecting rights to education and cultural integrity. However,
the promise is there for a positive and visionary change in the
relations between the State of Montana and the Indian nations.
CONCLUSION

At the Symposium on the Montana Constitution: Thirty
Years Later, Professor Raymond Cross spoke of the state
constitution as a "living document." The words recorded on
paper were just the beginning, he said. They lay a moral and
ethical foundation for the growth and development of the
Montana Constitution through active implementation and
163.
See S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 99 (1996)
(discussing Article 27 and other instruments which protect 'rights of cultural integrity").
164. 61 SOC. RES., supra note 160, at 498-499.
165. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 44-1231.01-.05 (2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-33-1 to 11
(Michie 2001).
166. See, e.g., Peyote Way Church of God, Inc. v. Thornburgh 922 F.2d 1210 (5th
Cir. 1991) (upholding TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.111 (Vernon 2001)).
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enforcement. The Montana Constitution is analogous to the
treaties between Indian nations and the national government.
These are also widely perceived as "living documents" that
embody an ongoing set of responsibilities and duties that impact
the lives of contemporary Native people.
The "moral and ethical responsibility" for framing the
future, however, is a joint responsibility of the State of Montana
and the tribal governments. Article X, Section 1(2) can serve as
the basis for Indian nations to transmit their vision of cultural
sovereignty for the future. Cultural sovereignty is "the effort of
Indian nations and Indian people to exercise their own norms
and values in structuring their collective futures."167 Inherent
sovereignty comes from within the Indian nation and is not to be
defined by the courts of the external society.
Cultural
sovereignty is a process of reclaiming history, tradition, and
cultural identity. 168 As Professor Pocock has explained, in
relation to Maori claims to land and autonomy, sovereignty is
the "power to constitute one's own history, on the level of
conceptualization and possession and on that of authority and
action."1 69 This process is clearly served by the language of
Article X, Section 1(2), which opens the door for Indian nations
to design and implement curricula that represent the historical
and contemporary realities of Native life. This process may
entail cooperative efforts between tribal colleges and state school
districts. Tribal colleges have been instrumental in efforts to
revive Native languages and ensure the survival of Native
cultures. 70 And the links between language, culture, and
education are increasingly apparent in the innovative curricula
7
being developed by tribal colleges.' '
With the full implementation of Article X, Section 1(2),
Montana will accomplish an important step toward achieving
justice for its citizens-both Indian and non-Indian. Justice is
not a "unitary" concept, but an intercultural concept that
requires a full examination of the interplay between
167. Wallace Coffey & Rebecca Tsosie, Rethinking the Tribal Sovereignty Doctrine:
Cultural Sovereignty and the Collective Future of Indian Nations, 12 STAN. L. & POLY
REv. 191, 196 (2001).
168. Id. at 202.
169. J.G.A. Pocock, Law, Sovereignty, and History in a Divided Culture: The Case of
New Zealand and the Treaty of Waitangi, The Iredell Memorial Lecture, Lancaster
University (October 10, 1991), excerpted in GETCHES, supra note 11, at 1003-07.
170. Coffey & Tsosie, supra note 167, at 207.
171. See TRIBAL COLLEGE JOURNAL 10-26 (Spring 2000) for a series of essays on
these important developments.
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constitutional norms and human rights norms for the diverse
citizens that live within the state.
The promise of
"differentiated citizenship" is a just and inclusive society that
transcends the dichotomies between autonomy and assimilation,
separatism and integration, and allows citizens to achieve their
full potential in society on their own terms.
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